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I. INTRODUCTION 
History says, Don’t hope 
On this side of the grave. 
But then, once in a lifetime 
The longed-for tidal wave 
Of justice can rise up, 
And hope and history rhyme. 
The Cure at Troy, Seamus Heaney1 
In 1993, a report issued by the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights (now Human Rights First) began its initial chapter with the 
following account: 
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1 . SEAMUS HEANEY, THE CURE AT TROY, A VERSION OF SOPHOCLES’ PHILOCTETES 77-78 
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During the evening of Sunday, February 12, 1989, Patrick 
Finucane, a 38-year-old Belfast solicitor; his wife, Geraldine; 
and his three children aged 9, 13, and 17 were eating dinner 
and watching television in the kitchen of their home in North 
Belfast. At approximately 7:25 p.m., a loud noise came from the 
front door. Finucane and his wife jumped up from the table, 
and Finucane opened the glass fire door leading to the front 
hall. Halfway down the hall two masked figures dressed in 
black with camouflage jackets advanced with drawn pistols. 
Mrs. Finucane, who was standing just behind her husband, 
attempted to activate a panic alarm behind the kitchen door. 
According to Finucane’s eldest son, his father’s last act was to 
throw himself up against the door. Two or three shots 
shattered the glass and hit Finucane in the chest and stomach, 
leaving him lying face up on the floor. The gunmen entered the 
kitchen and shot Finucane in the head and neck about a dozen 
more times, at least once and probably more from a range of 
about 15 inches. At some point, Mrs. Finucane was herself 
wounded in the ankle, probably by a ricocheting bullet. The 
children were unharmed physically but witnessed 
everything.2 
The next day the Ulster Freedom Fighters (“UFF”), a loyalist 
paramilitary group, claimed responsibility for the murder.3 
The Lawyers Committee report went on to explain that the 
security forces then operating in Northern Ireland had colluded in 
the killing. It stated first that: “There is substantial evidence 
suggesting the British Army’s complicity in Finucane’s murder.”4 
In addition, it noted: 
There is also substantial evidence pointing to the involvement 
of the RUC [the Royal Ulster Constabulary, then Northern 
Ireland’s police force] in the form of knowing acquiescence or 
perhaps even instigation. Two independent sources told us 
that the RUC had a double agent in the Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA) [a related loyalist paramilitary group]. 
According to these sources, the double agent informed the RUC 
 
2. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 24 (1993). 
3. Id. at 25. 
4. Id. at 3. 
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that Finucane was a target, assuming they would prevent the 
murder from taking place.5 
Patrick Finucane’s murder was but one of six cases that 
Canadian Justice Peter Cory was later called upon to investigate.6 
These, in turn, involved but seven deaths out of over 3,000 killings 
associated with “the Troubles,”7 the era of violent civil strife that 
plagued Northern Ireland roughly from 1968, when peaceful civil 
rights protests were met by rioting, through 1998, the year the 
Irish and UK governments concluded the “Good Friday 
Agreement,” and with it a substantial reduction in political 
violence.8 Every one of these deaths is unique and tragic. Yet the 
six cases that Justice Cory was called upon to examine were singled 
out for several reasons. Each instance, in some measure, involved 
a victim or victims that was high-profile or symbolic, entailed 
evidence of collusion between paramilitaries and British or Irish 
state authorities, or raised suspicions that the relevant 
government actors had been actively seeking to suppress the truth, 
and so remained a matter of “grave public concern.” 9  On these 
bases the Irish and UK governments, in the follow-on Weston Park 
Agreement of 2001, among other things agreed to “appoint a judge 
of international standing from outside both jurisdictions to 
undertake a thorough investigation of allegations of collusion in 
the cases . . . ”10  The judge of international standing was Peter 
Cory.11 
In the Essay that follows, fellow Canadian Justice Rene 
Pomerance offers a fresh perspective on why Justice Cory’s effort 
was a high point, yet one that remains incomplete, in Northern 
Ireland’s ongoing quest for transitional justice. Her effort fittingly 
pays tribute to Justice Cory’s unwavering commitment to his 
 
5. Id. 
6. Pomerance, infra. 
7. Table NI-SEC-04: Deaths (number) due to the security situation in Northern Ireland 
(only), 1969-2015, CAIN WEB SERV., https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#04 
[https://perma.cc/4K5T-MYTJ] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). 
8. For one of many books on the Troubles, see David McKittrick & David McVea, 
MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES (2012). 
9. Implementation Plan issued by the British and Irish Governments on 1 August 2001, 
CAIN WEB SERV., https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/bi010801.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R9N8-GT3U] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (detailing the British and Irish 
governments’ plan to implement the Good Friday Agreement). 
10. Id. 
11. Pomerance, infra.  
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charge, qualities she witnessed firsthand as his then assistant. 
Importantly, it also provides new and disturbing information 
about British government attempts to impede his work, especially 
with regard to the murder of Patrick Finucane. Justice Pomerance’s 
contribution also sheds light on why Justice Cory’s 
recommendations have yet to be fully implemented. 
This essay will attempt to place Justice Pomerance’s account 
in context. It will do so by concentrating only on the especially 
sensitive Finucane case, yet from several broader perspectives. 
First, it will highlight Justice Cory’s achievement by contrasting his 
investigation with the failed inquiries that came both before and 
after. Next, it will emphasize the features of Justice Cory’s inquiry 
that made it a breakthrough, notwithstanding the alarming 
resistance it met as provided by Justice Pomerance. Most 
importantly, this piece will underscore how Justice Cory’s 
challenge, though yet unmet, continues to provide the one basis for 
the only just resolution of the Finucane murder. 
II. THE FAILURE OF PRIOR INQUIRIES 
Cory exemplifies an old practical challenge recognized in a 
still-pioneering academic field—transitional justice. Ruti Teitel, 
who wrote the (leading) book on the topic, states that: 
“[t]ransitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes.”12  Mechanisms to realize transitional justice in a given 
jurisdiction reflect a broad range of options. In certain cases, 
starting with the Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, at 
least some accused of humanitarian and human rights violations 
have been subject to criminal trial, including the death penalty. In 
other situations, various considerations lead to the opposite 
approach of granting a general amnesty. Any number of 
approaches have fallen in between, perhaps most famously the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, through 
 
12. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003). 
For a comprehensive analysis of transitional justice, see RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE (2000). 
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which amnesty was granted, but only to the extent that individuals 
fully disclose their wrongdoing.13 
By contrast, the approach to transitional justice in Northern 
Ireland has been delayed, contested, and anything but coherent. To 
an extent, the confused situation reflects the fact that the 
predecessor regime, which oversaw previous wrongdoing, 
remains in power. As it was, peace presented possibilities but in 
and of itself did not point in any obvious direction. In particular, 
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which effectively brought an end 
to the Troubles, simply did not address the thorny issue of how 
best to deal with the legacy of over 3,000 unsolved political 
killings.14 As far as a general initiative, little occurred until 2005. 
That year the reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland, the 
successor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, launched its Historical 
Enquires Team (“HET”), to investigate these deaths, and make 
findings that, given sufficient evidence, could be prosecuted by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”). 15  Supplementing this 
initiative are investigations by the Police Ombudsman of Northern 
Ireland (“PONI”), which focuses on allegations of misconduct by 
the police.16 
These efforts have yielded much new information, yet have 
not come without controversy concerning their slow pace, the 
impartiality of the HET in particular, and ongoing disagreement as 
to what should be done on the basis of the evidence uncovered. The 
2014 Stormont House Agreement, which reestablished Northern 
Ireland’s shared executive, sought to deal with these and other 
issues. Among other things, the Agreement calls for the 
establishment of a new independent Historical Investigations Unit 
(“HIU”). Yet as with the Police Service’s HET, the new unit would 
leave the decision to prosecute or not with the DPP.17 Of greater 
concern, earlier this year the Conservative UK Government 
 
13. See Transitional Justice Genealogy, supra note 12, at 77 n.57; see also Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 35 of 1995 § 20 (S. Afr.) (on the need for amnesty 
applicants to make a “full disclosure” of their acts). 
14. See Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, 2114 U.N.T.S. 
473.  
15. DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE, INVESTIGATIONS INTO FATALITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
INVOLVING BRITISH MILITARY PERSONNEL, 2016-17, HC 1064, ¶¶ 8, 20, 22 (UK). 
16. Id. 
17. Stormont House Agreement art. 30-40, Ir.-U.K., Dec. 23, 2014. 
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introduced legislation that would make the prospect of 
prosecution even more remote. According to its announcement, 
“[t]he Government will ensure that the investigations which are 
necessary are effective and thorough, but quick . . . . Only cases in 
which there is a realistic prospect of a prosecution as a result of 
new compelling evidence would proceed to a full police 
investigation and if necessary, prosecution.”18 Otherwise, a case 
“would be closed . . . though family reports would still be provided 
to the victims’ loved ones.”19 In effect, Northern Ireland’s approach 
to transitional justice will likely prove to be a mix of long delayed 
investigations augmented by rare and occasional prosecutions. 
Standing apart from this patchwork were the inquiries 
undertaken by Justice Cory. As noted, the Irish and UK 
governments in the 2001 Weston Park Agreement agreed to do 
something about transitional justice legacy issues pending a more 
comprehensive solution. That something was to single out a 
handful of high-profile cases drawn from each community to be 
subject to a serious, independent investigation. 20  The ultimate 
selection comprised the cases of Patrick Finucane, Lord Justice and 
Lady Gibson, Robert Hamill, Rosemary Nelson, and Billy Wright. 
Justice Pomerance concisely sets out both the circumstances of 
each killing and why they resonated. 21  As only an insider can, 
Justice Pomerance also recounts the successes and challenges that 
this entailed.22 
Yet as she also makes clear, of all six inquiries Justice Cory 
took up, the most ill-starred was and remains the murder of Patrick 
Finucane. 23  Almost from the first, the press and international 
human rights groups reported credible evidence of collusion by the 
security forces—both the RUC and British Army—in facilitating 
the killing. 24 Over time they kept up the pressure and aired new 
 
18. Press Release, U.K. Gov’t Northern Ireland Office, Addressing Northern Ireland 
Legacy Issues (Mar. 18, 2020). 
19. Id. 
20. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. 
21. See Pomerance, infra. 
22. See Pomerance, infra. 
23. See Pomerance, infra. For an excellent account of the Finucane murder and the 
failure of subsequent inquiries, see Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder 
of Belfast Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3297 (2006). 
24. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 52-58. 
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information. Especially dogged in this regard were the then 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, British Irish Rights Watch, 
and the BBC’s Panorama program. By contrast, the first relevant 
official investigations touched upon the Finucane case incidentally. 
Both were conducted by John (now Sir) Stevens, the Chief 
Constable of the Northumbria police who would go on to head the 
Metropolitan (London) police. The first inquiry, ordered in 1989, 
examined possible official collusion in the sectarian killing of 
Loughlin Maginn, a Catholic with no paramilitary connections.25 
“Stevens I” would uncover a double agent in a loyalist paramilitary 
group who passed information to and from the British Army. 
“Stevens II,” begun in 1994, turned more generally to collusion 
between loyalist groups and the security forces. At the time, much 
speculation arose as to the extent any findings of collusion by 
Stevens overlapped with evidence that had already come to light 
concerning Finucane. The reports helped conclude that although 
collusion existed, nothing beyond an executive summary was 
released.26 
Only with “Stevens III,” which began in 1999, did an official 
inquiry specifically investigate collusion in the Finucane case.27 
Eventually a Commissioner of the Metropolitan (London) Police, 
Stevens’ 2003 report confirmed the suspicions raised by the press 
and human rights groups a decade before.28 Substantial evidence 
existed that the RUC as well as the British Army could have 
prevented the killing, had in other ways facilitated it, did not 
conduct adequate investigations into the murder, and to the 
contrary had taken various measures to make sure that the truth 
would never come to light.29 
At the end of the day, the Stevens inquiries still involved police 
investigating police (and Army), did not involve public hearings, 
and did not result in any convictions. One individual, William 
 
25. The Stevens Inquiry: Chronology, BBC (Apr. 17, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2954383.stm 
[https://perma.cc/HZS9-S5R2].  
26. Id. 
27. Sir John Stevens, Stevens Inquiry 3: Overview and Recommendations, RELATIVES 
FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 17, 2003), https://relativesforjustice.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Stevens-3-Inquiry-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW6K-
MPME]. 
28. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
29. Stevens, supra note 27. 
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Stobie, who allegedly had supplied the guns for the murder, did 
stand trial for his involvement, but the trial collapsed for the lack 
of evidence, and Stobie was later shot dead, with a loyalist 
paramilitary group claiming responsibility.30 Likewise troubling, 
Stevens reported resistance to his investigations at almost every 
turn, including a suspicious fire at his team’s office during Stevens 
I.31 This resistance in its own way tended to support the picture 
that had been steadily emerging. In their effort to obtain 
intelligence, the security forces had compromised themselves and 
the rule of law by tolerating, and even facilitating, the crimes of 
informers and agents in paramilitary groups to obtain 
information.32 
III. CORY’S BREAKTHROUGH 
Against this backdrop, Justice Cory’s inquiry represented a 
giant leap forward. First, it provided the most comprehensive 
account of the evidence that had been uncovered regarding Patrick 
Finucane’s murder. Second, it argued in no uncertain terms for the 
need of an independent public inquiry. 
Even without the official resistance she recounts, Justice 
Pomerance gives some idea of the challenge in bringing together 
the many complex leads and threads that the case involves. It must 
be said that the eventual report, released in 2004, met that 
challenge masterfully. 33  As it was an independent investigation 
conducted by a foreign judge, Justice Cory was under no constraint 
to limit the publication of his team’s findings to a brief executive 
summary. 34  Instead the result ran over 100 pages of densely 
packed detail.35 That rigor, however, did not prevent the report 
from making a clear and compelling case. Overwhelming evidence 
indicated that two units of the security forces had played a role in 
the murder. One was the Force Research Unit of the British Army. 
The other was the Special Branch of the RUC. Each group had been 
heavily involved in the use of informers and agents in the loyalist 
paramilitaries in particular. To keep these agents in place, their 
 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, PATRICK FINUCANE, 2004, HC 470, (UK). 
34. Pomerance, infra. 
35. Pomerance, infra. 
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government handlers and higher-ups were more than ready to 
look the other way, or even help out, when it came to their 
paramilitary groups engaged in various operations, including 
murder. The report also made clear that Finucane’s murder was 
likely just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.36 
In part for that reason, Justice Cory fulfilled his mandate with 
an unambiguous call for an immediate public inquiry. At the time, 
there was concern that a delayed and desultory prosecution might 
delay such an inquiry, and the Cory report left no doubt as to which 
should take precedence. In its own words: 
The Finucane case was specifically chosen as one of the six 
cases to be reviewed to determine if there was sufficient 
evidence of collusion to warrant the directing of a public 
inquiry. In light of this provision in the original agreement, the 
failure to hold a public inquiry as quickly as it is reasonably 
possible to do so could be seen as a denial of that agreement, 
which appears to have been an important and integral part of 
the peace process.37 
No less important, the Report left no doubt as to what a 
genuine public inquiry should entail. Among other things, it would 
require: 
An independent commissioner or panel of commissioners. 
[The tribunal having] full power to subpoena witnesses and 
documents together with all the powers usually exercised by a 
commissioner in a public inquiry. 
[The tribunal selecting] its own counsel who should have all 
the powers usually associated with counsel appointed to act 
for a commission or tribunal of public inquiry. 
[The tribunal] empowered to engage investigators who might 
be police officers or retired police officers to carry out such 
investigative or other tasks as may be deemed essential to the 
work of the tribunal. 
The hearings, to the extent possible, should be held in public. 
The findings and recommendations of the Commissioners 
should be in writing and made public.38 
 
36. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 33, at ¶ 1.41-12.70.  
37. Id. at ¶ 1.296. 
38. Id. at ¶ 1.294. 
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With Justice Cory’s efforts, not only was the Weston Park 
Agreement apparently fulfilled, it looked as though the truth 
behind the Finucane murder, and the Pandora’s box of systemic 
government collusion, was at last at hand. 
IV. UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
Things didn’t quite work out that way. Prophetically, Cory’s 
report on Finucane noted, “[t]he failure [to undertake an 
independent public inquiry] could be seen as a cynical breach of 
faith which could have unfortunate consequences for the peace 
accord.”39 Not incidentally, it went on to note the effects of any 
significant delay: “The Finucane family will be devastated. A large 
part of the Northern Ireland community will be frustrated. Myths 
and misconceptions will proliferate and hopes of peace and 
understanding will be eroded.”40 
Against Justice Cory’s counsel, not only was there delay, but to 
date a public inquiry has yet to take place. Instead the UK 
government’s response has effectively justified a charge of “cynical 
breach of faith.”41 To begin, the government forged ahead with just 
the type of prosecution that would delay an inquiry. That initiative 
at least led to the guilty plea of Ken Barrett, the triggerman, the one 
man convicted in the Finucane murder.42 Apart from any delay, the 
conviction was met with suspicions that genuine accountability 
would proceed no higher than this single loyalist agent and 
paramilitary.43 
Worse, however, is what came next. In 2005 Parliament 
enacted a new Public Inquiries Act that severely restricted the 
independence and power of such investigations as they had 
previously been undertaken.44 Then, dramatically in 2007, Prime 
 
39. Id. at ¶ 1.296. 
40. Id. at ¶ 1.299. 
41. Id. at ¶ 1.296. 
42. Barrett gets 22-year term for the Pat Finucane murder, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 16, 
2004), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/barrett-gets-22-year-term-for-pat-finucane-
murder-1.990214 [https://perma.cc/D9FZ-5SUN]. 
43. Press release from the Finucane family following the conviction of Ken Barrett, PAT 
FINUCANE CTR. (Sept. 17, 2004), https://www.patfinucanecentre.org/pat-finucane/press-
release-finucane-family-follwing-conviction-ken-barrett [https://perma.cc/5U5E-X7DQ]. 
44. U.K. Public Inquiries Act 2005, c. 12 (Eng.) 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/12/contents [https://perma.cc/KP56-
Y6YS] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). 
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Minister David Cameron met with the Finucane family and its 
representatives at 10 Downing Street. There he admitted to and 
apologized for collusion by the security forces in the killing. At the 
same meeting, he announced that an official inquiry into the 
murder would indeed be conducted, only by a lawyer, Sir Desmond 
de Silva QC, who would not have subpoena power, hold hearings, 
or engage a team of investigators as Justice Cory had urged.45 
The Finucane family, as well as human rights groups, rightly 
condemned the procedure as a “sham.”46  Just last year, the UK 
Supreme Court effectively agreed. In a suit brought by the Finucane 
family, the Court determined that the de Silva review did not 
comply with Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
which guarantees the right to life. 47  Put another way, the 
government could have avoided this judicial rebuke had it followed 
Justice Cory’s recommendations. 
No less troubling than the official half measures, foot dragging, 
and palliatives is the government toleration of the obstruction of 
any and all inquiries. As noted, the Stevens inquires met with often 
blatant obstruction by the security forces under investigation, 
efforts that Stevens himself consistently decried.48 It should come 
as no surprise that the Cory Investigation met with similar 
resistance. Some incidents have come to light but remain 
 
45. John F. Burns, British Prime Minister Apologizes in Killing of I.R.A. Lawyer, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/europe/cameron-
apologizes-for-british-role-in-finucane-killing.html [https://perma.cc/2TYA-TZB5]. It 
should not go without comment that the Times’s slapdash headline is misleading to the 
point of being libelous. As noted, there is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Finucane was a 
member of or associated with the IRA. Likewise, certain of Mr. Finucane’s clients were 
alleged to have been members of the IRA, but that fact hardly justifies of epithet of “I.R.A. 
Lawyer.”  On the lack of Da Silva’s subpoena power, see Ed Neafsy, Case of murdered 
Troubles lawyer Patrick Finucane returns to court, IRISH CENT. (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.irishcentral.com/opinion/finucane-inquiry-courtcase 
[https://perma.cc/C4ZA-7UVU]. 
46. Owen Bowcott, Pat Finucane’s family denounce report as “sham”, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
12, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-family-report-
sham [https://perma.cc/FNS2-FSVD]. 
47. In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review (Northern 
Ireland) [2019] UKSC 7, [24] (appeal taken from NICA). 
48. Stevens, supra note 27, at paras. 3.1-3.5. 
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underreported, foremost the security services wiping out the Cory 
team’s hard drives.49 
In this light, one signal service that Justice Pomerance’s piece 
performs is to show the scope of the government’s efforts to 
undermine the Cory team’s efforts—and Justice Cory’s often 
brilliant parries to keep the investigation going and to exert 
pressure for its release. In these ways, the account that follows 
importantly adds to the historical record. It also provides an 
inspiring model for how transitional justice should be sought, both 
in Northern Ireland and beyond. 
On that note, the UK government has yet to fulfill Justice 
Cory’s recommendation or the decision of its own highest court. 
 
 
49. MI5 erased hard drives held by collusion inquiry, BBC investigation reveals, IRISH 
LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.irishlegal.com/article/mi5-erased-hard-drives-
held-by-collusion-inquiry-bbc-investigation-reveals [https://perma.cc/YU9A-LSNR]. 
